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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XI Published Quarterly During the University Year by the
Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law. No.
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE*
I will try, in the few minutes I will speak to you, to discuss the
political and historical phases of this question, as those who have
spoken before me have ably discussed the other propositions which this
important issue presents. While there has been for over half a century
a strong sentiment, not only in this country but throughout the world,
in favor of the arbitration of international differences as a substitute
for war, the sentiment for an adjudication of such controversies did
not find a concrete expression until about twenty-five years ago. The
concept of international justice had not, as a practical proposition,
advanced until then, beyond the point that differences between coun-
tries that might threaten war could be better compromised on a basis
of "give and take" than by force. While there was and is no doubt as
to the correctness of this position, yet jurists and statesmen of clear
vision began to ask why it was that civilized nations could not settle
their differences on the basis of fundamental principles of reason,
justice and law, just as civilized men have come to settle their contro-
versies. And so in the Second Hague Conference, in 1907, the Ameri-
can delegation proposed the adjudication of justiciable controveries
before a permanent court in place of compromise and adjustment by
a specially summoned tribunal. Though the plan failed of adoption,
the proposition had been brought before the nations of the world, and
to it they turned after the wreck and ruin of the Great War as the
best means to prevent a repetition of such an awful disaster to civili-
zation.
*Address before the League of Women Voters of St. Louis, Friday,
October 23, 1925.
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In our own country this issue found expression in the political
platforms of 1920. The Democratic platform declared in favor of the
League of Nations, which provided for the adjustment of international
questions and the control and direction of certain international
affairs on the basis of political association, and by the exercise of
political or official authority. And as ancillary to this association of
nations there was to be established a permanent Court of International
Justice for the determination of certain justiciable controversies. While
I am convinced that, at that time, the majority of the Republicans of
the country favored the covenant for the League of Nations with what
was known as the Lodge Reservations, the opposition of the "few
irreconcilables," who had defeated that covenant in the Senate, was
sufficient to exclude from the declaration of the Republican platform
any mention of the League of Nations. Therefore that party declara-
tion was confined to a pledge to support the principle of international
association to provide for the settlement of internati6nal differences
before a World Court which would make its decisions on the basis of
justice and of law.
The plank upon that proposition was as follows: "The Repub-
lican party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the
peace of the world. We believe that an international association must
be based upon international justice and must provide methods which
shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and
the decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and
general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened
by political action." This plank, emphasizing the idea of adjudication,
was written by Elihu Root, who had then been selected by the Council
of the League of Nations as one of the members of a committee to
devise a protocol of the International Court of Justice and, according
to the newspapers published at the time, was submitted to and received
the approval of Senators Borah, Johnson and the other members of
the small band of so-called irreconcilables in the United States Senate.
Senator Borah now contends that for us to join in an adherence
to the Court would be unwise but, aside from the question of advisa-
bility, it is clear that it is a violation of the solemn pledge of the
Republican party to the American people for the government under
its control to fail to adopt it. Particularly is this true as, in 1924, there
was a specific declaration by the Republican convention in favor of
giving our approval to the protocol providing for adherence to this
Court, and a declaration in favor of the World Court and the League
of Nations is also in the platform adopted by the Democratic National
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Convention. So, while a United States Senator may be a Democrat
or a Republican and oppose this proposition, he cannot contend that
he is thereby standing by the pledges of his party or helping to keep
its faith with the American people. If such declarations in our party
platforms, agreed to unanimously, favored by all representatives of
the divergent thought in party councils, are not followed by official
action, then party honor and party responsibility become a farce and
a fraud.
So, in addition to the great principle of international adjudication,
we have also this national question as to whether the promises in party
platforms are to be kept and party honor to be respected.
The two divergent attitudes towards the proposition of the World
Court, as they find expression in recent utterances, are something
as follows: We find, on the one hand, among the minor objections
of its opponents, some complaining that its authority is not sufficiently
compelling or mandatory and others that it is too complete and con-
trolling. Some object to the fact that it was initiated by a committee
appointed by the League of Nations, though its existence is independ-
ent of that organization. Others seem to be troubled over the fact
that the names of the judges are unfamiliar and that they have dif-
ficulty in pronouncing them. But if the judges of the Court bore such
customary names as Smith, Jones and Cohen, I have no doubt but
that some would object to the Court because the judges did not bear
names of sufficient distinction. In short, these minor objections, in
most cases, come from those who glorify the eighteenth century con-
ception of statesmanship announced by Voltaire in the cynical obser-
vation that "one should be interested in nothing beyond the limits of
his own cabbage patch." And so we find these eighteenth-century
minded statesmen setting up their judgment in favor of a policy of
national isolation that has been denounced by both parties and by
almost every religious, civic and commercial organization in the
United States. If this is so, one may well ask why it is that this
proposition has not before secured the necessary two-thirds approval
of the United States Senate. The answer is to be found in the fact
that the United States Senate is today apparently the most unrespon-
sive to public opinion of any legislative body in any self-governing
country. And that is largely due to the fact that the rules of that
body make it possible for a few Senators, particularly if they are able
and aggressive, to exercise an influence and authority that could not
obtain in any other legislative body in this or any other land.
The right of practically unlimited debate has created of the Sen-
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ate something of a ruling oligarchy in American life that is contrary
to the genius and the spirit of our institutions. This is true because
it is in the power of a few members both to delay and to defeat meas-
ures that are favored not only by a majority of the people but by a
majority of its own members.
Notwithstanding the clear manifestation of public opinion in favor
of the World Court for the last three years; notwithstanding the
adoption of a resolution in the House of Representatives almost three
to one in its favor, the Senate has declined heretofore even to enter
upon its discussion. Over two and a half years after the proposition
was formally submitted to the Senate by President Harding it has
announced that it will begin the debate. When that debate will end
is, under the present rules of the Senate, a mere matter of speculation.
Though it may seem foreign to the purpose of this discussion, I wish
to say that in my opinion Vice President Charles G. Dawes is advo-
cating a most necessary and important measure of reform by insisting
that the rules of the Senate shall be changed so as to make it impossi-
ble for a few men in that body to defeat the will of a majority and to
set up their judgment against the preponderant opinion of the Ameri-
can people. No statesman, in my opinion, has advocated a more im-
portant principle of reform since Theodore Roosevelt, twenty-five years
ago, aroused the slumbering conscience of the people to a realization
of the violation of the principles of common honesty and a square
deal by existing abuses in commercial and official life.
What, then, is the fundamental conception of world peace that
this proposition presents? Agreements between nations to respect each
other's frontiers and not to engage in war, have time and time again
proven futile because when controversies have arisen no established
method for their settlement has existed. World peace must be based
on international confidence that justice will be done between all na-
tions, and that alone can come from the creation of, and respect for,
a system of just law administered by a tribunal that will have behind
its decisions the public opinion of the world.
And why should there not exist among nations a rule of law;
an awarding of justice according to settled rules of conduct, as now
prevails among men? We must face this problem with the full realiza-
tion that the only substitute for the rule of force and war is a rule of
law and justice. And why should not law and justice be international
in their scope and operation? The nations of the world have become
next-door neighbors through the achievements of science, which have
all but wiped out time and distance. Trade, industry, finance, litera-
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ture, science, art, Lducation, exchange of information; almost every
activity and interest of life are international in their scope and opera-
tion. Why should not the world set up rules of conduct and standards
of right and justice among nations, when within nations such rules
and standards constitute the very foundations of government and
society.
What can be a better safeguard for our civilization than to have
a rule of law substituted for a rule of force? For law, in its highest
and broadest sense, is the instrument of justice, the handmaid of order;
the guarantor of individual right, the arbiter of dispute and the
reconciler of differences. It is the cement which binds together the
structure of human institutions. It is the best hope of the world today
for saving humanity from the awful destruction and horrors of war.
If in this great movement to establish a rule of international law as
a substitute for war our nation is not found among those participating
in this effort to safeguard the civilization of the future, will not the
muse of history, in that distant future when the acts of men and nations
can be judged free from the prejudices and the confusion of the pres-
ent, say to us, as Henry of Navarre said to Crillon of the siege of
Arques, "Hang yourself, brave Crillon. We fought at Arques and
you were not there." No nation and no generation has ever had such
an opportunity for inestimable service to humanity as is ours today,
and we will stand condemned or commended at the judgment seat of
history as we join or fail to join in promoting, through a rule of law,
peace, prosperity and justice throughout the world.
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